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Abstract—Internet of Things, and other connected devices
require secure mechanisms to facilitate the propagation of
Command & Control messages to enable the remote manage-
ment of the devices — including the ability to remotely perform
software update on the devices. This paper introduces a new
protocol designed to sit on top of the commonly-used MQTT
protocol to provide a secure and confirmable mechanism to
deliver such messages to remote Internet of Things devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a new protocol which provides a
secure and confirmed mechanism to facilitate the exchange
of command-and-control messages to remote Internet of
Things (IoT) devices.
Section II describes the utility of Command & Control
messages within the context of the IoT, and discusses the
requirements for remote software update for IoT devices;
Section III describes Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
(MQTT), a communication architecture commonly adopted
in the IoT; and Section IV introduces the Secure Remote
Update Protocol (SRUP) protocol, which is built on top of
MQTT. Finally Section V describes the current state of an
implementation of the protocol and planned future work.
II. COMMAND & CONTROL AND SOFTWARE UPDATE
FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS
A. Command & Control for the Internet of Things
Whilst the IoT covers a multitude of different types
of device, and different applications; many classes of IoT
devices (for example, those used in environmental monitor-
ing) are designed to operate remotely (potentially without
convenient access to the device by a human operator) and
semi-autonomously. As such these types of devices require
a system-level Command & Control (C2) system to support
their operation.
Such a C2 system enables the devices to receive and react
to messages pertaining to the device itself (as opposed to the
application software the device is running). This enables a
human-operator or autonomous agent to interact with the
device remotely.
Whilst the primary example of C2 messages within this
paper are those to enable the software on the device to be
updated; supporting many other types of C2 message will
also be beneficial to the operation of a fleet of remote, semi-
autonomous devices.
For example it may be desirable to be able to remotely
trigger a reboot of the device, or to cause it to enter a low-
power mode. Some applications may require a mechanism
to turn off devices (noting that such an action would likely
render the device inoperable, unless the device has a capa-
bility to turn itself back on); or even to cause the device to
self-destruct — figuratively, or literally.
Examples of C2 messages that may be useful within the
context of IoT devices may include commands to:
• Enter low power mode / wake to full power mode
• Turn off
• Self-destruct
• Reboot
• Self-Test
• Enter a specific operating mode (e.g. beacon mode, or
safe mode)
B. Software Update in the Internet of Things
The ability to remotely apply software updates to IoT de-
vices is critical. Software updates may be required to provide
simple bug-fixes to address discovered vulnerabilities, or to
add new functionality to the software. Updates of the appli-
cation software can also deliver a significant reconfiguration
of the operation of the device itself. Such reconfiguration can
modify the device to provide new functionality — and can
utilize previously dormant hardware within the device. This
adaptability of the hardware can deliver software defined
hardware.
Depending on the details of the implementation some
aspects of this application software configuration can be
achieved through the use of data-driven software: where the
application’s behaviour is determined by a combination of
the software and the data. At its most extreme the data could
be source code expressed in a general-purpose scripting lan-
guage. More typically however the software will be a special
purpose application whose operation will be determined by
the data it is supplied. Using this type of approach can
potentially simplify many routine software updates to the
task of supplying a data file to the device — and causing it
to be processed by the application software. This technique
978-1-5090-4130-5/16/$31.00 ©2016 Crown
also has advantages in the context of bandwidth-constrained
environments: as a data file containing just the changes to
an existing configuration data file on the device may be
expected to have a very-much smaller file-size than a new
binary executable software application file.
C. The challenge of remote software update
Unlike locally updating the software on a device there
are unique difficulties that must be taken into account when
considering a remote software update. IoT devices often
have their primary user-interface provided by a network
connection, and so even if device can be accessed physically
it may still require remote update via the network interface.
It must be impossible for the update process to cause the
device to fail to a state in which it cannot be accessed
via the network: as this would render the device unusable.
As such the most important requirement is that any update
is recoverable in the event of network or power-supply
interruption: and that in the event of such an incident, the
process can be either resumed or restarted.
There is also a requirement to be able to track whether
a particular device has been updated; and know (with
certainty) that the device has received, and is using, the
updated software. In some situations the process also needs
to be capable of delivering a unique software payload or
update to each device to handle situations where bespoke
software may be required by devices based on operational
circumstances (e.g. all devices in a specific geographical
area, or all devices belonging to a particular customer or
operator).
D. Software Update Paradigms
There are essentially two ways to initiate a software up-
date: either pushing the software to the device (establishing
an inbound connection to the device — and uploading the
data), or by triggering the device to fetch the software update
itself, via an appropriate signal; and causing the device to
download the software to itself. If pushing software to a
device, an inbound network connection to the device is es-
tablished and the data is simply uploaded. However, having
the ability to open a port directly on a device increases
the risk of that device being subject to compromise; and
it also places a requirement on the device to be able to
authenticate connections. As such it is extremely difficult to
secure such a process — and it is not recommended for any
application connected to the internet: especially applications
where security or privacy are important.
The use of a signal to initiated software download by
a device is analogous to the way that Operating System
patches are often distributed: remote systems do not push the
update to the computer — but rather the computer monitors a
known repository, waiting for an indication that updates are
available. This signalling may be implemented by either the
device polling a suitable semaphore checking for a change,
or by some other type of notification signal.
The SRUP protocol has been designed around the use of
this approach.
The use of this technique also means that the device does
not have to be directly addressable from the Internet: as
may be the case if it is connected to a network which is
protected by a Firewall or behind a router using Network
Address Translation (NAT).
E. Cryptographic Security Considerations
Regardless of the process used to get the software onto
the device, the process needs to be both secure (to prevent a
malicious third-party from abusing the mechanism to cause
devices to run malware), and confirmable: such that the
controller can be certain that devices have been updated
correctly.
This can be addressed by using cryptographic algorithms
to sign the software and messages as authentically origi-
nating from an approved source. Furthermore by utilizing
a private key within the device, it is possible to ensure
that only messages, data or software updates intended for
a specific device are usable by that device.
The identity of the URL where the data can be found,
can be verified using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Secure Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol (HTTPS); and their
content checked for integrity using a hashing function such
as those implemented in the Secure Hash Algorithm, version
2 (SHA2) standard [1].
III. A PUBLISH / SUBSCRIBE ARCHITECTURE FOR IOT
COMMUNICATIONS
There are a number of communications architectures used
to facilitate communications with IoT devices; one of the
most commonly used is a publish / subscribe paradigm.
Within IoT devices perhaps the most commonly used pro-
tocol for this is MQTT.
A. MQTT
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is a
lightweight brokered publish / subscribe protocol, originally
developed by Andy Stanford-Clark (IBM) and Arlen Nipper
(Arcom) in 1999 to provide lightweight telemetry for the
oil and gas industry. It became an OASIS standard in 2013.
[2] All messages sent are routed via a broker; the broker is
responsible for tracking all subscriptions, and sending data
to subscribers when a publisher issues a message. MQTT
runs over Internet Protocol Suite (TCP/IP) networks, using
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [3] as the transport
layer.
MQTT is by default an insecure protocol (all data is sent
as plain text) — but it can be secured with the application
of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [4] to the traffic.
There are a number of open-source brokers — this re-
search has been carried out using the Mosquitto broker.
Mosquitto implements the MQTT protocol versions 3.1 and
3.1.1; and is an iot.eclipse.org project [5].
MQTT is a very widely supported protocol within the
IoT. MQTT libraries exist for many common development
platforms (including Arduino, and mbed); and it is supported
by the vast majority of programming languages. There are
also a large number of clients available — both command-
line tools, and GUI applications; & there are a number
of clients available for mobile devices too (both iOS and
Android). MQTT is also the protocol used by Amazon Web
Services (AWS) for their IoT platform. [6].
IV. THE SECURE REMOTE UPDATE PROTOCOL — SRUP
A. The concept of SRUP
SRUP is designed as a secure, efficient and straightfor-
ward protocol to carry C2 messages to IoT devices.
The SRUP protocol is built on top of MQTT — and
provides an efficient binary message structure contained
within the payload of an MQTT message. For example, a
SRUP update message contains cryptographic signatures for
the data to be retrieved; the source from which that data
can be obtained; and other elements required to securely
authenticate the message.
Although SRUP can be used in support of software
updates on IoT devices, it is not a protocol for software
updates. Rather SRUP securely conveys the C2 messages to
the device: providing it with the information that it requires
to carry out retrieval, and validation of the data; and a
mechanism to provide confirmation of the process.
SRUP does not attempt to provide a protocol for the actual
download of the data — this is handled over a conventional
HTTPS connection to the server providing the software.
The advantage of SRUP over a more simple approach is
that it makes it easy to target individual devices for specific
updates; and provides a confirmable mechanism ensure that
the update has been successfully and correctly received by
the device. Whilst this may not be a general requirement
today — it is possible to imagine that in the near-future
such a practice may be more common-place (for example:
to know whether devices have applied a security fix after a
vulnerability was discovered). Moreover such a requirement
does exist today for devices operating in certain Defence
& Security environments; or other safety-critical operations
where an auditable log may be required to positively identify
the configuration state of devices.
The protocol also means that the process is recoverable in
the event of an incomplete download. The protocol specifies
confirmation and activation messages — meaning that the
update would be applied on command, once the device has
retrieved & checked the data, and successful retrieval has
been signalled to the originator. This also means that a
software update operation to be carried out on a fleet of
IoT devices can be conducted in such a way as to minimize
the impact on the functionality and availability of the fleet,
that would otherwise occur if all devices were updated
simultaneously.
SRUP requires that all devices within the scope of a given
C2 server have a copy of that server’s public key in order
to authenticate messages from that server. The management
and update of keys can be handled by using an approach
similar to that shown for a software update. For messages
sent from a device, the server will use that device’s public
key — with the device’s identity being indicated via the
MQTT subject. The server will receive the device’s public
key as a part of the process to register the device with
the server. It is proposed that a class of C2 messages to
support this device registration process could be introduced
in a subsequent version of the protocol.
B. SRUP in action
To illustrate the use of SRUP for a software update
command, consider a system composed of a number of IoT
devices using MQTT and a suitable broker to communicate
with a command-and-control server. A user-interface is
provided via a web-application which communicates with
the C2 server.
The exchange of routine data (such as sensor readings
from the devices) can be communicated directly between the
user and the devices via MQTT (over TLS where required);
but C2 messages would be sent using SRUP on top of the
(potentially encrypted) MQTT traffic.
To instigate a software update operation, the initial step
would be for the user to provide the details to the C2 server,
via the web interface. The C2 server would then send a
SRUP INITIATE message to the device (or devices) in
question.
A SRUP daemon running on the device receives the
INITIATE message, and commences the download of the
data over HTTPS. Having received the file, the daemon
then calculates a hash value for the data retrieved (using
the secure SHA-256 algorithm) and compares it with the
value specified in the INITIATE message. If they match,
the daemon would then send RESPONSE message to signify
a successful completion of the retrieval; if they don’t (or if
any other errors occur) then the RESPONSE message would
signify the failure of the retrieval & contain details of the
error. Lastly, on receipt of the RESPONSE message, the
C2 server sends an ACTIVATE message to request that the
device activates the newly downloaded software or data.
The details of what occurs on receipt of the ACTIVATE
message is highly dependent on the specifics of the device;
but consider the most simple case, where there is just one
piece of application software running on the device. In this
situation the daemon must send a terminate signal to the
currently running version of the application (which should
ensure that any hardware under its control is placed into a
safe state before exiting). Upon confirmation of successful
termination of the application, the SRUP daemon should
then copy or move the software downloaded to a suitable
location within the device’s filesystem, and execute it. Typi-
cally it would be expected that for purposes of recovery, the
previous version of the software would not be overwritten
permitting reversion to a “known good state” in the event of
issues with the newly obtained software.
C. Protocol Details
This section contains the technical details of the three
message types associated with the software update command
described above.
1) Initiate message: The INITIATE message must com-
municate five elements to the device.
• An identifier signalling the device for which the mes-
sage is intended
• The URL at which the software can be retrieved by the
device
• A cryptographic hash value for the software to be
retrieved
• A unique token value to indicate the SRUP transaction
• A cryptographic signature — signing the data contained
in the message
Using HTTPS ensures encryption of the communication
to prevent eavesdropping, and authoritatively establishes the
identity of the server to prevent man-in-the-middle style
attacks.
The SRUP INITIATE message is sent as a compound
binary message consisting of the various fields of the SRUP
protocol, as shown in table I. In addition to the five items
described previously — there is also a protocol version
number (to easily permit future expansion of the protocol),
and a message-type identifier to signal that this message is
an INITIATE message.
Note that this scheme utilizes a number of variable length
fields. This ensures that variable length elements such as the
URL are sent as efficiently as possible (without padding) and
without arbitrarily constraining the length of the URL that
could be used.
In order for the receiving device to know how many of
the arbitrary bytes compose each element of the message,
in addition to the data shown in table I it is also necessary
to send two additional bytes per element, which convey the
length of the following element.
Although using two bytes for this adds slightly to the
overall message length, it ensures that there is effectively
no practical limit on the length of the elements. (216−1)≡
65,535 characters: more than long-enough for any currently
conceivable URL or cryptosystem signature / hash value.
To avoid the potential for error when sending data between
machines with different architectures (big-endian vs. little-
endian) implementations of SRUP must include a custom
marshalling / demarshalling routine for the lengths to ensur-
ing that regardless of the local architecture, the wire-format
Element Typical Length Meaning
Version 1 byte The version of SRUP being
used — e.g. 0x01
Message
Type
1 byte The type of SRUP message
being sent:
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_
INITIATE taking the value
0x01
Signature Protocol Dependent The cryptographic signature
of the message calculated
from the control server’s pri-
vate key
UUID Application Dependent
but typically 16 bytes
The universally unique iden-
tifier of the device (or device
group) for which the mes-
sage is intended
Token Application Dependent
but typically 16 bytes
A token to uniquely identify
this SRUP transaction
URL Variable The URL at which the soft-
ware update can be retrieved
Digest Protocol Dependent A secure digest (Hash value)
of the file to be retrieved
Table I
THE SRUP INITIATE MESSAGE TYPE
for the lengths (little-endian) is correctly converted to a local
two-byte int.
Therefore in order to send the example message shown
in table II, the byte-stream to be sent as an MQTT message
payload would be as shown in table III.
Note that to aid exposition — the SRUP fields shown
here, take unrealistic example values.
Element Value Length
Version 0x01 1
Message Type 0x01 1
Signature SIG DATA 8
Target UUID TARGET 6
Token TOKEN 5
URL https://www.example.com 23
Digest DIGEST 6
Table II
THE ELEMENTS OF AN EXAMPLE SRUP INITIATE MESSAGE
2) Response message: The SRUP RESPONSE message
also consists of a custom binary payload sent in an MQTT
message. The RESPONSE payload consists of:
• The transaction token supplied in the corresponding
initiate message (so that the server could track the
message that the device was responding to)
• A status message indicating whether or not the process
had been successful
• A cryptographic signature to ensure that the message
originated from the real intended target device
Hex Data Meaning
01 Version
01 Message Type
00 08 Length of Signature (8)
53 49 47 5F 44 41
54 41
ASCII String:
SIG_DATA
00 06 Length of Target (6)
54 41 52 47 45 54 ASCII String:
TARGET
00 05 Length of Token (5)
54 4F 4B 45 4E ASCII String: TOKEN
00 17 Length of URL (23)
68 74 74 70 73 3A
2F 2F 77 77 77 2E
65 78 61 6D 70 6C
65 2E 63 6F 6D
ASCII String:
https://www.example.com
00 06 Length of Digest (6)
44 49 47 45 53 54 ASCII String:
DIGEST
Table III
AN EXAMPLE OF THE RAW BYTES OF A SRUP INITIATE MESSAGE IN
HEXADECIMAL NOTATION
The elements of the response message are shown in table
IV.
Element Typical Length Meaning
Version 1 byte The version of SRUP being
used — e.g. 0x01
Message
Type
1 byte The type of SRUP message
being sent —
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_
RESPONSE taking the value
0x02
Signature Protocol Dependent The cryptographic signature
of the message calculated
from the device’s private key
Token Application Dependent
but typically 16 bytes
The token specified in the
previous SRUP initiate mes-
sage
Status 1 byte A value indicating the suc-
cess of the update — or con-
veying the reason for the fail-
ure
Table IV
THE ELEMENTS OF THE SRUP RESPONSE MESSAGE
The values which can be taken by the status byte are
shown in table V.
As with the initiate message — the length of the token
and signature will be variable, and thus will be preceded by
the length of each, in bytes.
3) Activate message: Once the server has received the
response from the device signifying successful completion
of the retrieval, it can then send a message instructing the
device to apply the new software or configuration. Again this
Identifier Value Meaning
SRUP_UPDATE_
SUCCESS
0x00 Update data successfully re-
ceived
SRUP_UPDATE_
FAIL_SERVER
0xFD Update unsuccessful —
HTTPS server did not
respond
SRUP_UPDATE_
FAIL_FILE
0xFE Update unsuccessful — the
specified file could not be re-
trieved from the server
SRUP_UPDATE_
FAIL_DIGEST
0xFF Update unsuccessful — hash
value of the retrieved file did
not match
Table V
VALUES FOR THE SRUP RESPONSE STATUS BYTE
is sent as a custom message payload using similar principles
to the other message types illustrated in this example. The
activate message requires the simplest payload: as it only
needs to send the transaction token, and a signature. The
elements of the message are shown in table VI.
Element Typical Length Meaning
Version 1 byte The version of SRUP being
used — e.g. 0x01
Message
Type
1 byte The type of SRUP message
being sent —
SRUP_MESSAGE_TYPE_
ACTIVATE taking the value
0x03
Signature Protocol Dependent The cryptographic signature
of the message calculated
from the control server’s pri-
vate key
Token Application Dependent
but typically 16 bytes
The token specified in the
previous SRUP initiate & re-
sponse messages
Table VI
THE ELEMENTS OF THE SRUP ACTIVATE MESSAGE
Depending on the requirements of the implementation, the
device could indicate that it has received and acted upon the
message by sending second response message. Additional
RESPONSE statuses could be added to the standard to
represent this.
D. Additional SRUP capabilities
Although the basic implementation of SRUP is as de-
scribed, further work is planned to expand the protocol.
1) SRUP for other types of C2 message: In addition to
using SRUP for software updates — the same idea can
be used to send other types of system-level Command &
Control message.
Using SRUP in this way makes it extremely hard for a
malicious party to spoof the C2 messages: as only validly
signed messages would be acted upon — with the protocol
enforcing the checking of the integrity and veracity of the
retrieved data.
Any of the types of C2 message described in section II
could be incorporated into SRUP by simply adding addi-
tional message types to be used to send these instructions
— together with cryptographic signatures and (where appli-
cable) digests to provide a means to verify the authenticity
of the messages.
2) SRUP over HTTPS: For devices which would spend
much of their time asleep — it would also be possible to
implement SRUP over HTTPS: having the device poll a
web-service to retrieve messages at a suitable frequency, and
entering a very-low power sleep mode in between.
Whist reception of this message could initiate an MQTT
connection to a specified broker; for such occasional traffic
it may be preferable to use HTTPS and to reimplement the
underlying SRUP protocol using JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) to transport the elements of the message.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to demonstrate the potential utility of SRUP a
C++ library has been written to implement the protocol,
and this has been used together with the Mosquitto broker;
and an example device-side daemon and C2 server. Both
the daemon & server have been implemented using C++
components, and Python scripts: with the interprocess com-
munication handled using Apache Thrift [7]. Initial testing
has shown the protocol to be effective; and given the security
afforded by the use of cryptographic signatures within the
SRUP messages, the use of an encrypted MQTT connection
is only required for situations where C2 information needs
to be secured against eavesdropping. Further work is in
progress to extend the protocol to cover some of the other
types of C2 message described in section II.
The C++ source code for a library implementing the
SRUP protocol is available, and is released under the terms
of the MIT open licence [8].
The initial release of the source-code for the software
library can be found at:
doi:10.5258/SOTON/401895
The source code for the latest version of the library and
an example implementation of the device-side daemon, and
C2 server can be found at:
https://github.com/dstl/SRUP/
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